PATCH_SITES=	https://github.com/strongswan/strongswan/commit/

PATCHFILES=	a619356b5f21bfe3c13f1576eb1d16c015532ceb.patch:-p1

From 027421cbd2e6e628f5f959c74d722afadc477485 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org>

Date: Tue, 11 Jul 2023 12:12:25 +0200

Subject: [PATCH] charon-tkm: Validate DH public key to fix potential buffer

 overflow

Seems this was forgotten in the referenced commit and actually could lead

to a buffer overflow.  Since charon-tkm is untrusted this isn't that

much of an issue but could at least be easily exploited for a DoS attack

as DH public values are set when handling IKE_SA_INIT requests.

Fixes: 0356089d0f94 ("diffie-hellman: Verify public DH values in backends")

Fixes: CVE-2023-41913

---

 src/charon-tkm/src/tkm/tkm_diffie_hellman.c | 7 ++++++-

 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/src/charon-tkm/src/tkm/tkm_diffie_hellman.c b/src/charon-tkm/src/tkm/tkm_diffie_hellman.c

index 2b2d103d03e9..6999ad360d7e 100644

--- src/charon-tkm/src/tkm/tkm_diffie_hellman.c

+++ src/charon-tkm/src/tkm/tkm_diffie_hellman.c

@@ -70,11 +70,16 @@ METHOD(key_exchange_t, get_shared_secret, bool,

 	return TRUE;

 }

-

 METHOD(key_exchange_t, set_public_key, bool,

 	private_tkm_diffie_hellman_t *this, chunk_t value)

 {

 	dh_pubvalue_type othervalue;

+

+	if (!key_exchange_verify_pubkey(this->group, value) ||

+		value.len > sizeof(othervalue.data))

+	{

+		return FALSE;

+	}

 	othervalue.size = value.len;

 	memcpy(&othervalue.data, value.ptr, value.len);

-- 

2.34.1