Attachment 149035 Details for Bug 194723 – Unified diff for security/pam_google_authenticator/files/patch-pam_google_authenticator.c

[patch] Unified diff for security/pam_google_authenticator/files/patch-pam_google_authenticator.c

patch-pam_google_authenticator.c (text/plain), 1.82 KB, created by paul on 2014-11-04 17:16:22 UTC

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Creator: paul

Created: 2014-11-04 17:16:22 UTC

Size: 1.82 KB

patch

obsolete

>--- pam_google_authenticator.c.orig	2014-01-30 15:17:38.000000000 +0000
>+++ pam_google_authenticator.c	2014-11-04 17:05:55.000000000 +0000
>@@ -503,10 +503,6 @@
> }
> #endif
> 
>-static int get_timestamp(void) {
>-  return get_time()/30;
>-}
>-
> static int comparator(const void *a, const void *b) {
>   return *(unsigned int *)a - *(unsigned int *)b;
> }
>@@ -538,6 +534,41 @@
>   return NULL;
> }
> 
>+#if !defined(STEPSIZE)
>+static int get_timestamp(void) {
>+  return get_time()/30;
>+}
>+#else
>+static int get_timestamp(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *secret_filename,
>+                       const char *buf) {
>+  const char *value = get_cfg_value(pamh, "STEP_SIZE", buf);
>+  if (!value) {
>+    // Default step size is 30.
>+    free((void *)value);
>+    return get_time()/30;
>+  } else if (value == &oom) {
>+    // Out of memory. This is a fatal error.
>+    return 0;
>+  }
>+
>+  char *endptr;
>+  errno = 0;
>+  int step = (int)strtoul(value, &endptr, 10);
>+  if (errno || !*value || value == endptr ||
>+      (*endptr && *endptr != ' ' && *endptr != '\t' &&
>+       *endptr != '\n' && *endptr != '\r') ||
>+      step < 1 || step > 60) {
>+    free((void *)value);
>+    log_message(LOG_ERR, pamh, "Invalid STEP_SIZE option in \"%s\"",
>+                secret_filename);
>+    return 0;
>+  }
>+  free((void *)value);
>+
>+  return get_time()/step;
>+}
>+#endif
>+
> static int set_cfg_value(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *key, const char *val,
>                          char **buf) {
>   size_t key_len = strlen(key);
>@@ -1162,7 +1193,11 @@
>   }
> 
>   // Compute verification codes and compare them with user input
>+#if !defined(STEPSIZE)
>   const int tm = get_timestamp();
>+#else
>+  const int tm = get_timestamp(pamh, secret_filename, *buf);
>+#endif
>   const char *skew_str = get_cfg_value(pamh, "TIME_SKEW", *buf);
>   if (skew_str == &oom) {
>     // Out of memory. This is a fatal error

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Attachments on bug 194723: 148843 | 148844 | 149004 | 149005 | 149035 | 149036 | 149563