Attachment 256331 Details for Bug 280037 – draft patch that addresses comment no.11 and 14

[patch] draft patch that addresses comment no.11 and 14

patch-qat.patch (text/plain), 2.94 KB, created by ss3bsd on 2025-01-01 23:51:37 UTC

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Creator: ss3bsd

Created: 2025-01-01 23:51:37 UTC

Size: 2.94 KB

patch

obsolete

>diff --git sys/dev/qat/qat/qat_ocf.c sys/dev/qat/qat/qat_ocf.c
>index 8958c7b82e49..52e3388bab6b 100644
>--- sys/dev/qat/qat/qat_ocf.c
>+++ sys/dev/qat/qat/qat_ocf.c
>@@ -850,6 +850,7 @@ qat_ocf_process(device_t dev, struct cryptop *crp, int hint)
> 	status = qat_ocf_cookie_alloc(qat_instance, &qat_cookie);
> 	if (CPA_STATUS_SUCCESS != status) {
> 		rc = EAGAIN;
>+		device_printf(dev, "EAGAIN qat_ocf_cookie_alloc\n");
> 		goto fail;
> 	}
> 
>@@ -905,6 +906,7 @@ qat_ocf_process(device_t dev, struct cryptop *crp, int hint)
> 		if (CPA_STATUS_RESOURCE == status) {
> 			mtx_unlock(&qat_instance->cyInstMtx);
> 			rc = EAGAIN;
>+			device_printf(dev, "EAGAIN qat_ocf_handle_session_update\n");
> 			goto fail;
> 		} else if (CPA_STATUS_SUCCESS != status) {
> 			mtx_unlock(&qat_instance->cyInstMtx);
>@@ -918,6 +920,7 @@ qat_ocf_process(device_t dev, struct cryptop *crp, int hint)
> 	if (CPA_STATUS_SUCCESS != status) {
> 		if (CPA_STATUS_RETRY == status) {
> 			rc = EAGAIN;
>+			device_printf(dev, "EAGAIN cpaCySymDpEnqueueOp\n");
> 			goto fail;
> 		}
> 		device_printf(dev,
>diff --git sys/kern/uipc_ktls.c sys/kern/uipc_ktls.c
>index 294a196db60d..ed30d9711244 100644
>--- sys/kern/uipc_ktls.c
>+++ sys/kern/uipc_ktls.c
>@@ -1856,6 +1856,22 @@ ktls_destroy(struct ktls_session *tls)
> 	MPASS(tls->refcount == 0);
> 
> 	inp = tls->inp;
>+	
>+	if ( !tls->sync_dispatch && atomic_swap_int(&tls->destroying, 1) == 0 ){
>+		/* 
>+		 * prevent a deadlocking race condition observed with QAT driver
>+		 * where qat_ocf_remove_session() which is called by ktls_ocf_free()
>+		 * fails to wait in-flight callback execution and leaks memory
>+		 * resources in the driver.
>+		 */
>+		counter_u64_add(ktls_destroy_task, 1);
>+		TASK_INIT(&tls->destroy_task, 0,
>+			ktls_destroy_help, tls);
>+		(void)taskqueue_enqueue(taskqueue_thread,
>+			&tls->destroy_task);
>+		return;
>+	}
>+
> 	if (tls->tx) {
> 		wlocked = INP_WLOCKED(inp);
> 		if (!wlocked && !INP_TRY_WLOCK(inp)) {
>diff --git sys/opencrypto/ktls_ocf.c sys/opencrypto/ktls_ocf.c
>index f61fb7f73b5d..1bc6bf98d377 100644
>--- sys/opencrypto/ktls_ocf.c
>+++ sys/opencrypto/ktls_ocf.c
>@@ -243,6 +243,15 @@ ktls_ocf_dispatch_async_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
> 		crp->crp_etype = 0;
> 		crp->crp_flags &= ~CRYPTO_F_DONE;
> 		counter_u64_add(ocf_retries, 1);
>+		
>+		/* delay a little time as workaround to prevent rapid recursive
>+		 * calls that result in kernel panic by resource starvation.
>+		 * The panic would still occur if the crypto function returns EAGAIN forever, 
>+		 */
>+		 
>+		printf("ktls_ocf_dispatch_async_cb EAGAIN DELAY\n");
>+		DELAY(100);
>+		
> 		error = crypto_dispatch(crp);
> 		if (error != 0) {
> 			crypto_destroyreq(crp);
>diff --git sys/sys/ktls.h sys/sys/ktls.h
>index 693864394ffe..97c3745dd0f9 100644
>--- sys/sys/ktls.h
>+++ sys/sys/ktls.h
>@@ -202,6 +202,9 @@ struct ktls_session {
> 
> 	/* Used to destroy any kTLS session */
> 	struct task destroy_task;
>+
>+	/* will be destroyed by the destroy_task */
>+	int destroying;
> } __aligned(CACHE_LINE_SIZE);
> 
> extern unsigned int ktls_ifnet_max_rexmit_pct;

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Attachments on bug 280037: 251744 | 251776 | 251786 | 256331 | 256343