Attachment 31832 Details for Bug 52878 – file.diff

[patch] file.diff

file.diff (text/plain), 3.06 KB, created by Brian Minard on 2003-06-03 02:40:07 UTC

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Creator: Brian Minard

Created: 2003-06-03 02:40:07 UTC

Size: 3.06 KB

patch

obsolete

>--- security.7	Wed May 28 19:24:13 2003
>+++ security.7	Wed May 28 19:38:18 2003
>@@ -40,9 +40,9 @@
> (see
> .Xr chflags 1 )
> on every system binary because while this may temporarily protect the
>-binaries, it prevents a hacker who has broken in from making an
>+binaries, it prevents a cracker who has broken in from making an
> easily detectable change that may result in your security mechanisms not
>-detecting the hacker at all.
>+detecting the cracker at all.
> .Pp
> System security also pertains to dealing with various forms of attack,
> including attacks that attempt to crash or otherwise make a system unusable
>@@ -103,10 +103,10 @@
> user's account.  If an attacker has found a way to break root on a machine,
> the attacker may not have a need to install a backdoor.
> Many of the root holes found and closed to date involve a considerable amount
>-of work by the hacker to cleanup after himself, so most hackers do install
>-backdoors.  This gives you a convenient way to detect the hacker.  Making
>-it impossible for a hacker to install a backdoor may actually be detrimental
>-to your security because it will not close off the hole the hacker found to
>+of work by the cracker to cleanup after himself, so most crackers do install
>+backdoors.  This gives you a convenient way to detect the cracker.  Making
>+it impossible for a cracker to install a backdoor may actually be detrimental
>+to your security because it will not close off the hole the cracker found to
> break in the first place.
> .Pp
> Security remedies should always be implemented with a multi-layered
>@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@
> way to look for modified files is from another (often centralized)
> limited-access system.
> Writing your security scripts on the extra-secure limited-access system
>-makes them mostly invisible to potential hackers, and this is important.
>+makes them mostly invisible to potential crackers, and this is important.
> In order to take maximum advantage you generally have to give the
> limited-access box significant access to the other machines in the business,
> usually either by doing a read-only NFS export of the other machines to the
>@@ -466,7 +466,7 @@
> thought.  Even more importantly, a security administrator should mix it up
> a bit - if you use recommendations such as those given by this manual
> page verbatim, you give away your methodologies to the prospective
>-hacker who also has access to this manual page.
>+cracker who also has access to this manual page.
> .Sh SPECIAL SECTION ON D.O.S. ATTACKS
> This section covers Denial of Service attacks.  A DOS attack is typically
> a packet attack.  While there isn't much you can do about modern spoofed
>@@ -633,7 +633,7 @@
> keys that give you access to the rest of the system, and you ssh to an
> unsecure machine, your keys becomes exposed.  The actual keys themselves are
> not exposed, but ssh installs a forwarding port for the duration of your
>-login and if a hacker has broken root on the unsecure machine he can utilize
>+login and if a cracker has broken root on the unsecure machine he can utilize
> that port to use your keys to gain access to any other machine that your
> keys unlock.
> .Pp

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