Bug 77148

After a bit of discussion on #bsddocs, we've made a tiny change to the diff.

Index: en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/mac/chapter.sgml
===================================================================
RCS file: /home/ncvs/doc/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/mac/chapter.sgml,v
retrieving revision 1.38
diff -u -r1.38 chapter.sgml
--- en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/mac/chapter.sgml	12 Jan 2005 01:55:04
-0000	1.38
+++ en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/mac/chapter.sgml	5 Feb 2005 19:35:13
-0000
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@
       files by setting certain objects as classified?</para>
 
     <para>In the file system case, access to objects might be
-      considered confidential to some users but not to others.
+      considered confidential to some users, but not to others.
       For an example, a large development team might be broken
       off into smaller groups of individuals.  Developers in
       project A might not be permitted to access objects written
@@ -372,7 +372,7 @@
       with a value of <quote>low</quote>.</para>
 
     <para>A few policies which support the labeling feature in
-      &os; offers three specific predefined labels.  These
+      &os; offer three specific predefined labels.  These
       are the low, high, and equal labels.  Although they enforce
       access control in a different manner with each policy, you
       can be sure that the low label will be the lowest setting,
@@ -385,7 +385,7 @@
       used on objects.  This will enforce one set of
       access permissions across the entire system and in many
       environments may be all that is required.  There are a few
-      cases; however, where multiple labels may be set on objects
+      cases where multiple labels may be set on objects
       or subjects in the file system.  For those cases, the
       <option>multilabel</option> option may be passed to
       &man.tunefs.8;.</para>
@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@
       configures the policy so that users are placed in the
       appropriate categories/access levels.  Alas, many policies can
       restrict the <username>root</username> user as well.  Basic
-      control over objects will then be released to the group but
+      control over objects will then be released to the group, but
       <username>root</username> may revoke or modify the settings
       at any time.  This is the hierarchal/clearance model covered
       by policies such as Biba and <acronym>MLS</acronym>.</para>
@@ -1565,7 +1565,7 @@
 
       <listitem>
 	<para>The <literal>biba/high</literal> label will permit
-	  writing to objects set at a lower label but not
+	  writing to objects set at a lower label, but not
 	  permit reading that object.  It is recommended that this
 	  label be placed on objects that affect the integrity of
 	  the entire system.</para>
@@ -1653,7 +1653,7 @@
 
     <para>The <acronym>MAC</acronym> version of the Low-watermark
       integrity policy, not to be confused with the older &man.lomac.4;
-      implementation, works almost identically to Biba but with the
+      implementation, works almost identically to Biba, but with the
       exception of using floating labels to support subject
       demotion via an auxiliary grade compartment.  This secondary
       compartment takes the form of <literal>[auxgrade]</literal>.

Comment 2 Tom Rhodes 2005-02-05 21:22:15 UTC

Responsible Changed
From-To: freebsd-doc->trhodes

Mine

Comment 3 Tom Rhodes 2005-02-08 19:44:27 UTC

State Changed
From-To: open->closed

Patch applied, thanks for the submission!